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Case No, 20020703-SC
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to "possess" a firearm, despite the clear mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503, which
prohibits the possession,, or use of a firearm by a restricted person.
•

ISSUE

PRESENTED

QN

AFPfcAl AM) M ANDARDS OF REV IEW

Issue: Whether Utah Code Ann. $ /U-IU-JU^ . ?ohibiting the possession c i i is 3 : f
a firearm by a restricted person, accords with article .. M- . - the Utah Constitution, which
allow s the I huh Legislature to restrict the. "lawful .

.rearms.

Standard of Review (>ii a M nl nt < n t i n u i i ilhiih i i iiiiiil i i m n i s . flu* ilt i isnui ill iillln

court of appeals, not the district court, and applies the same standard of review used by
'the court of appeals, Clark \> Clark, 2001 UT 44,«! * ^ P Id 538, 540, A trial court's
»s I wis n,l (in ,i Il ,11 i n III i .ill
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i
reviewed for correctness. State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, f 18, 993 P.2d 854.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
i
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 6
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for the other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from
defining the lawful use of arms.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (1999)

!

A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers,
possesses, uses or has under his custody or control... any
firearm is guilty of a third degree felony . . .
i
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a) (1999)
A Category I restricted person is a person who... is on
probation or parole for any felony . . .
I
The complete text of these provisions is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged on August 15, 2000, with possession of a firearm by a
restricted person, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10503(2)(a), and theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404
and 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii) (1999). R. 2. He was bound over for trial following a preliminary
hearing on October 4,2000. R. 18.
On January 4,2001, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-503 is unconstitutional because it violated the right to bear arms guaranteed

2
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by article I, § 6 of the I Jtah Constitution. R. 45, 124. The trial court denied the motion,

Code Ann. § 76-10-503 against a claim that it v iolated article I, § 6. R. 141-43. A copy
of the trial court's Ruling and Ordei I ited February 6, 2001, is attached as Addendum B.
A copy of S tate v I ; i is attached u..

laendumC.

Defend
condition that he be allowed to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. R. 164-71. 1le
was sentenced to 180 days in the Utah County I ail, although he was eligible for work
release afln "lllil ,l,r, y „iii„,l Mipnu'.ril iiirh.ilini ln,«r "' • ninilli1. I!"" IXP-H,.',.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 184. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's
conviction .on July 5, 2002 See State t Willis, 2002 I IT App 229, 52 P.3d 46, a cop> of

this Court on September 3, 2002. On January 24, 2003, this Coi in: Il: gi anted the petiti :)rt
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As a COD,,. \ icted felon, defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a gun.
190* Ji

D

("in! Ill) ill iiMsnii ln j 1.11- liiii'd ||iii("''('ill I \ v|)liiin IlIii ifiirsHici mil llhi1 N milhiiii mini

handgun in his bedrooni t; lose! \< 191; 15 - i0. At first, he stated that the handgun had
been given to him by his brother-in-law's mother,, who asked defendant to store it in his
lu'iliniiin

1" I'M V

I ulli1! i l r l c m l a n l i, l i i n i i i i l Ihr

iiiiii In,nil h m i

JJIKTII II

collateral for a loan. R. 190:2.
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However, his brother-in-law, Jonathan Coones, told a different story. In late July
2000, Coones reported to police that the handgun had been stolen from his motor home.
R. 191:6. Coones knew defendant had seen the weapon and had access to the motor
home, so he asked defendant whether he had "borrowed" the gun. R. 191:7. Defendant
stated that he had not. Id.
On August 1, 2000, Eric Price, the Adult Probation and Parole Officer assigned to
monitor defendant, received a phone call from Officer Brad Mitchell of the Spanish Fork

|

Police Department. R. 191:14-15, 18, 20. Officer Price conducted a search of
defendant's residence and discovered the 9-millimeter handgun. R. 191:15. Officer
I
Mitchell arrived soon thereafter and confirmed that the serial number on the recovered
handgun matched that of the gun Coones reported stolen. R. 191:21.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
ARTICLE I, § 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION DOES NOT
PROTECT THE RIGHT OF A CONVICTED FELON TO
"POSSESS" A FIREARM.

A

*

Defendant continues to claim that the Utah Constitution guarantees him the right to
"possess" afirearm,even though he is a convicted felon. Aplt. Br. at 6. Thus, he argues

-

that he cannot be convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2), which provides
that "a Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has
4
under his custody or control... anyfirearmis guilty of a second degree felony
Defendant is a "Category I" restrict person because he was on parole for evading a police

I
•

4

• •
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officer, a third-degree felony, at the time of his arrest on August 1, 20001. R. 191:15.
This argument contradicts clear precedent, runs counter to legislative history and defies
common sense.
In analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, "we construe the legislation, to the
extent possible, as being in compliance with the federal and state constitutions." State v.
Herrera, 1999 UT 64,1J 18, 993 P.2d 854. Moreover, "[w]hen reviewing the
constitutionality of a statute, we must presume that the statute is constitutional." State v.
Krueger, 975 P.2d 489, 495 (Utah App. 1999). "We resolve any reasonable doubts
concerning legislation in favor of constitutionality." Id. "A facial challenge to a
legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). A facial challenge
succeeds only when the statute at issue is incapable of any valid application. State v.
Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, % 78, 20 P.3d 342. Thus, a single valid application of the statute is
sufficient to defeat a facial challenge. Because the statute is clearly valid as applied to
defendant, his facial challenge must fail. See Herrera, 1999 UT at % 50 (facial challenge
fails if challenged statute is valid as applied to defendant).

1

This conviction was only one of numerous offenses committed by defendant as a
juvenile and as an adult between November 1997 and February 2001. See Adult
Probation and Parole Presentence Investigation Report, dated May 5, 2001. R. 190:3-9.
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The crux of defendant's argument is that 1984 amendments to article I, § 6 of the
Utah Constitution limited the Legislature's power to regulate firearms. Before the 1984
amendments, the provision stated:
The people have the right to bear arms for their security and
defense, but the Legislature may regulate the exercise of this
right by law.
In its current version, as amended in 1984, the provision reads:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from
defining the lawful use of arms.
Utah Const, art. I, § 6 (emphasis added). Defendant contends that the amended provision
allows the Utah Legislature to restrict the "use" of a firearm, but prohibits the enactment
of any statute that in any way limits the individual right to "possess" a firearm. Aplt. Br.
at 10-11. Thus, in defendant's view, convicted felons like himself have the constitutional
right to "possess" guns so long as they do not "use" them.
This contention cannot be seriously entertained. As demonstrated below,
defendant's argument is not supported by any logical reading of article I, § 6 or by the
legislative history of the provision.
A.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Rejected Defendant's
Claim that Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution Grants a
Convicted Felon the Right to Possess Firearms.

Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss after
determining that State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500, disposed of his claim that
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 was unconstitutional. Defendant does not challenge In, but
rather argues that it is distinguishable because that case dealt with the actual use of a
firearm as opposed to mere possession. Aplt. Br. at 7. Defendant is mistaken. In dealt
with precisely the same issue - a convicted felon charged with possession of a firearm.
In involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to discharging a firearmfroma
vehicle. 2000 UT App at f 2. One week later, defendant was involved in another
"shootout". Id. During an investigation, defendant admitted he was in possession of a
handgun. Id. The defendant was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503. Id. On appeal, the
defendant claimed the statute was an unconstitutional restriction of his right to bear arms.
Id. at ^ 3. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, noting that "[t]his statute only
restricts that right [to bear arms] under very limited circumstances - such as a felony
indictment or conviction." Id. at f 14. Thus, the court upheld the constitutionality of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 against a challenge by a convicted felon charged with possession
of a firearm - exactly the same challenge now made by defendant. Although the In
defendant did not explicitly argue the use/possession distinction, In is still directly on
point because it stands for the proposition that a convicted felon has no right to possess a
firearm under article I, § 6. This holding is obviously applicable to defendant.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, relying on In, correctly ruled that defendant's
challenge to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 was without merit. See
Willis, 2002 UT App 229 at U 3.
.- 7 .
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i
B.

The Plain Meaning of Article I, § 6 Demonstrates
Legislative Intent to Restrict the Use of Weapons by
Convicted Felons.

The Court of Appeals properly rejected defendant's claim that the Utah
Constitution protects his right to possess firearms by relying on the analysis of precisely
the same argument raised by the defendant in In. Nonetheless, even without relying on
In, defendant's claim is readily shown to be untenable.
Defendant contends that the plain meaning of article I, § 6 supports his argument

|

that Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 is unconstitutional. Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant
correctly notes that a court, in considering the constitutionality of a statute, "'must begin
its analysis with the plain language of the provision....'" Id. (citing Utah School Boards
Ass 'n v. Utah State Bd. of Education, 2001 UT 2, If 13, 17 P.3d 1125). Defendant errs,
however, in suggesting that a plain reading of article I, § 6 supports his strained

*

interpretation. On the contrary, defendant's interpretation relies on a hyper-technical and
overly restrictive reading of the constitutional provision's final clause, which states
"nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms." Utah
Const, art. I, § 6 (emphasis added). Defendant's argument limits "use" of a gun to the
active employment of the weapon, e.g., firing it, brandishing it or using it in the
commission of a crime. "Possession," on the other hand, is presumably passive carrying, storing, perhaps even handling - anything that is not actively "using" the
weapon.

8
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j

However, the amended language of article I, § 6 need not be defined so narrowly.
Under the plain ordinary understanding of the words, "use" and "possession" are not
mutually exclusive terms; in fact, they are inextricably linked. See Black's Law
Dictionary 1183 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "possession" as "the continuing exercise of a
claim to the exclusive use of a material object"); cf. U.S. v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153
(7th Cir. 2001) ("[U]se of a drug implies its possession"). And while the distinction
between active "use" and mere "possession" is clearly cognizable for some purposes - the
gun collector, for example, could be said to merely "possess" weapons without "using"
them - such "possession" can be as readily characterized as a kind of "use" - a passive
use, but a "use" nonetheless.2 Nothing compels the artificially narrow construction urged
by defendant.
Thus, defendant's claim that the Willis Court rendered the term "possess"
inoperative in Utah Code Ann § 76-10-503 is incorrect. See Aplt. Br. at 8. Because
statutes are required to narrowly define the range of regulated conduct, specificity is
required. Seef e.g., In, 2000 UT App 358, f 13 (Utah Code Ann § 76-10-503 not subject
to arbitrary enforcement because it is narrowly drawn). By contrast, "[s]tate constitutions
embody fundamental values and articulate the citizens' common aspirations for
constitutional governance and the rule of law. Rather than stating inflexible specific rules

2

The Court of Appeals illustrated the folly of defendant's hypertechnical
interpretation by noting that "the United States, by mere possession of a nuclear arsenal,
theoretically "uses" that arsenal to deter would-be aggressorsfromtaking military action
against it." State v. Willis, 2002 UT App 229, 52 P.3d 46, n.3.

9
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4
of conduct, they contain broad principles capable of accommodating societal changes."
Martin v. Beer Board, 908 S.W.2d 941, 946-47 (Tenn. App. 1995). In short, the broadly
drafted language of art. I, § 6 is entirely consistent with the necessarily more exacting
provisions of Utah Code Ann § 76-10-503.
Moreover, there are sound reasons to prefer a broader reading of article I, § 6.
First, a broader reading avoids invalidating Utah Code Ann § 76-10-503, which would
accord with the principle of construction that favors a constitutional interpretation

I

whenever possible. See, e.g., Herrera, 1999 UT at U 18 (reasonable doubts resolved in
favor of constitutionality); Krueger, 975 P.2d at 495 (statutes are presumed
4
constitutional).
Second, a broader interpretation avoids the absurd and contradictory results that
necessarily follow from the narrow reading urged by defendant. As this Court has stated:

4

"[W]e interpret a statute to avoid absurd consequences." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ^
12, 992 P.2d 986; see also U.S. v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) ("No rule of
4
construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd
consequences"); In re Overland Park Fin. Corp., 236 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001)
("[C]ourts will reject an interpretation of a statute that produces an absurd result"). Under

*

defendant's view, criminal background checks required for the purchase of a gun would
be useless against the felon who represents that he wishes merely to "possess" a weapon,
but not "use" it. Similarly, any restrictions on concealed weapons would likely be
unenforceable given that carrying a concealed weapon could be deemed mere
I
10
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"possession." Metal detectors at courthouses, government offices and airports would be
pointless if citizens had the unencumbered right to "possess" firearms. Perhaps even
prison inmates could claim a right to possess guns. In short, a would-be gunman could
not be legally penalized or even confronted until he actually began to "use" the gun, by
which point the damage would be done.
Obviously, Utah lawmakers could not have intended such bizarre consequences.
Moreover, nothing in the text of article I, § 6 requires such an interpretation.
Accordingly, defendant's claim that he cannot be penalized for possessing a handgun is
unpersuasive, to say the least. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected defendant's
claims.
C.

The 1984 Amendment to Article I, §6 Did Not Give
Convicted Felons the Right to "Possess" Firearms.

As shown above, the plain language of article I, § 6 does not support defendant's
position. His argument should be rejected for the reasons given above. Nonetheless, to
further illustrate defendant's mistaken reading of the provision, a review of the history of
the provision, both the original and amended versions, is helpful.
During the 1983 and 1984 sessions of the Utah Legislature, lawmakers considered
amendments to article I, § 6 which would explicitly state that the provision protected the
rights of individual gun owners, not merely the collective right of a state "militia." See
House Debate on Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, dated March 7, 1983. R. 84-94. Their
concern was based on decisions by the Utah Supreme Court and elsewhere recognizing

11
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that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected only the collective right to
bear arms. Id.; see also State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 679 (Utah 1982) ("Since the Second

.

Amendment right 'to keep and bear Arms' applies only to the right of the State to
maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms, there can be no serious
claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm").
Representatives also wanted to make sure that any amendment to article I, § 6 did
nothing to restrict the traditional ability of the state to regulate the use of

firearms,

i

particularly with regard to convicted felons. R. 87. This concern is clear in the following
colloquy between the House speaker and the amendment's House sponsor:
I
MR. SPEAKER: Would this [the 1983 amendment] preclude
registration of handguns and Saturday night specials?
REP. HARRISON: Well, I hope, hopefully it wouldn't. My
authority over here tells me "no way." Okay, as he points out, this does not
specifically address registration. It simply gives us our right to bear arms
for the specific things that are addressed in here. And it doesn 't preclude
legislation concerning concealed weapons or felons or any prohibitive
person from being, those rights being taken away from.
MR. SPEAKER: Would it be permissible for the Legislature, after
passage of this constitutional amendment, to then require registration of
Saturday night specials?
REP. HARRISON: He says, "Yes, if they wanted to." It was
permitted.
MR. SPEAKER: Assuming that the person acquiring the Saturday
night special was a law-abiding citizen and had not been convicted of a
prior felony, could the Legislature prevent his acquisition of a Saturday
night special or any handguns?
REP. HARRISON: If they wanted to.

'

|

I

<

R. 86-87. This version of the bill passed the House, but apparently was not approved by
the Senate. R. 78, 84.
i
12
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The following year, lawmakers again considered amendments and finally agreed
on the current version of article I, § 6, which was approved by voters in the November
1984 general election. Once again, lawmakers made it clear that the intent of the
amendment was to protect the rights of individual gun owners without affecting the
traditional ability of lawmakers to restrict the availability of weapons to certain classes of
individuals, including convicted felons. In the Voter Information Pamphlet prepared by
the lieutenant governor's office, Sen. Jack M. Bangerter and Rep. Donna M. Dahl,
sponsors of the amendment in the Senate and House, respectively, stated:
The amendment specifically guarantees broad individual liberties
and protects the enjoyment of those liberties from infringement. At the
same time, the legislature may continue to enact laws against the misuse
of arms and the police may continue to enforce such laws; enforcement
would extend to seizing arms which are misused.
An individual right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed. However,
convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors, and illegal aliens would not
be guaranteed this right. The principle of law that such persons may be
excluded from the enjoyment of the right to keep and bear arms is wellestablished
Voter Information Pamphlet, dated November 6, 1984. R. 69-73 (emphases added).
As noted by Sen. Bangerter and Rep. Dahl, excluding certain classes of
individuals from the right to bear arms has a long historical pedigree. As originally
conceived in the common law and understood by the Founding Fathers, the right to bear
arms was limited to "law-abiding citizens." State v. Hirsch, 34 P.3d 1209, 1211 (Or. App.
2001) (citing Stephen P. Halbrook, The Original Understanding of the Second
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I

Amendment, in The Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current Understanding, 117,
121 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed., 1991). As one historian noted:
Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common
law right to possess arms. That law punished felons with
automatic forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by
death. We may presume that persons confined in [jails]
awaiting trial on criminal charges were also debarredfromthe
possession of arms. Nor does it seem that the Founders
considered felons within the common law right to arms or
intended to confer any such right upon them. All the ratifying
convention proposals which most explicitly detailed the
recommended right-to-arms amendment excluded criminals
and the violent

j

<

Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
I
3

Amendment, 82 Mich. L Rev 204, 266 (1983); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A
Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn L Rev 461,480 (1995) ("[F]elons,
children, and the insane were excluded from the right to arms precisely as (and for the

^

same reason) they were excluded from the franchise"); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale LJ 1131, 1164 (1991) (right to bear arms, like right to
vote, accrues to citizens, not all people). In sum, the right to bear arms has historically
been denied to those who violate the law, thus proving themselves unworthy of the right.
The wording of article I, § 6, both before and after the amendment, evinces an
intent to adopt a limited right to bear arms, one that may be regulated by the Legislature.
This view is also consistent with the interpretation of similar state constitutional

3

Quoted in Hirsch, 34 P.3d at 1211.
14
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provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v.
Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1975) ("To limit the possession of firearms by those who,
by their past conduct, have demonstrated an unfitness to be entrusted with such dangerous
instrumentalities, is clearly in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare and
within the scope of the Legislature's police power") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Thus, the debates concerning the 1984 amendment to article I, § 6, as well as the
historical development of similar provisions elsewhere, demonstrate that lawmakers
realized the importance of restricting the use or possession of firearms by felons and that
they acted purposefully to safeguard that prerogative. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
correctly rejected defendant's claim that the Utah Constitution granted him a right to
possess a handgun.
CONCLUSION
In sum, defendant has failed to show that the Court of Appeals' decision was
incorrect. The Court of Appeals correctly relied on State v. In and properly held that the
Utah Constitution does not protect the right of convicted felons to possess firearms.
Alternatively, a review of the history of article I, § 6, as well as similar federal and state
constitutional provisions in other jurisdictions, also shows conclusively that the Utah
provision does not grant convicted felons the right to possess firearms. This Court should
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of July, 2003.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Sec. 6. [Right to bear armsJ
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd 8.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), J 2.
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76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon,
firearm, or explosive — Persons not permitted to
have — Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have
in his possession or under his custody or control any explosive, chemical,
or incendiary device as those terms are defined in Section 76-10-306 or
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or an explosive, chemical,
or incendiary device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun
described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the
United States, this state, or any other state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(via) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States,
has renounced such citizenship,
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third
degree felony.
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Addendum B

O . O ^ H w.j.i.yv-.r.rs of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

0

STATE OF UTAH,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff
Case No. 001403071
vs.
Judge Gary D. Stott
WADE LEON WILLIS,
Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed January 4, 2001, and his
accompanying memorandum in support thereof The State filed an Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, and the Defendant filed a Response.
Defendant moves to dismiss Count I of this prosecution on the grounds that U.C.A. § 7610-503(2)(a) violates Defendant's right to keep and bear arms pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of
the Utah Constitution. This provision of the Utah Constitution reads:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of
self) family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall
not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the
lawful use of arms.
The Defendant argues that a portion of the statute under which Defendant was charged is at odds
with this provision of the Utah Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional. Defendant was
charged under U.C.A. § 76-10-503(2)(a), which reads:
(2) Any Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has
under his custody or control:
(a) anyfirearmis guilty of a second degree felony.
Defendant maintains that the Utah Constitution has granted the legislature the power to regulate
the use offirearms,but not the possession offirearms.Defendant asserts that this statute is
unconstitutional because it prohibits the mere possession of afirearm,the crime with which
Defendant was charged in Count I.
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The recent case of State v. In 2000 UT App. 358, addresses the constitutionality of
U.C A § 76-10-503(2)(a) in light of Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. The Appellate
Court noted that "[w]hen addressing [constitutional challenges], this court presumes that the
statute is valid, and [resolves] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." IcL The court
then concluded that the statute "does not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear
arms. This statute only restricts that right under very limited circumstances—such as a felony
indictment or conviction. Such restrictions are constitutional." Id (citations omitted). The court
further cited State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1974), as holding that this statute is a
proper exercise of State police powers.
In light of this recent appellate decision, the Court holds that the restrictions contained in
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a), including the restriction of mere possession of afirearmby a restricted
person, do not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms because the statute only
restricts that right under very limited circumstances. Defendant's Motion is Dismiss is therefore
denied.

DATED this

fc

day of

f t h

. 2001,

BYTHECOURT
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410 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 2000 UT App 358, U14, 18P.3d500
(Cite as: 18P.3d500)
C
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Chamnap IN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 990710-CA.
Dec. 14,2000.
Defendant was convicted in the District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Sandra
Peuler, J., of possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person, and
defendant appealed.
The Court of
Appeals, Davis, J., held that:
(1)
defendant was a "convicted" felon for
purposes of statute prohibiting a person
convicted of a felony offense or under an
indictmentfrompossessing a handgun; (2)
"convicted" as used in statute means guilty
by verdict or plea, rather than by judgment
of conviction at sentencing; and (3)
application of statute to defendant did not
violate defendant's due process rights.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
UJ Criminal Law ^^1134(3)
UOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases

If the trial court's order is premised on
statutory interpretation, the Court of
Appeals affords the trial court's
interpretation no deference and reviews for
correctness.
|21 Criminal Law «=»1134(3)
HOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
A constitutional challenge to a statute
presents a question of law, which the
Court of Appeals reviews for correctness.
[31 Constitutional Law ^ 4 8 ( 1 )
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases
131 Constitutional Law ^ 4 8 ( 3 )
92k48f3) Most Cited Cases
When addressing a constitutional
challenge to a statute, the Court of Appeals
presumes that the statute is valid, and the
Court resolves any reasonable doubts in
favor of constitutionality.
[41 Weapons €= ^4
406k4 Most Cited Cases
Defendant was a "convicted" felon within
meaning of statute prohibiting a person
convicted of a felony offense or under an
indictment from possessing a handgun,
though defendant had pled guilty to a prior
felony but had not been sentenced on prior
felony at time of his subsequent offense; if
defendant was found innocent after
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It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that the meaning of a word
cannot be determined in isolation, but must
be drawn from the context in which it is
used.

Application of statute prohibiting person
convicted of a felony or under an
indictment from possessing a handgun to
defendant did not violate defendant's due
process rights; definition of "convicted"
was sufficiently explicit to inform ordinary
reader what conduct was prohibited,
statute was narrowly constructed, there
was no assertion that others had been
treated differently, it did not vest unlimited
enforcement discretion in anyone, and
statute only restricted one's right to bear
arms under very limited circumstances.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend 14: Const. Art. K
§ 6: U.C.A. 1953. 76-10- 503(3)(a)(i)
(1999).

|<Q Weapons ^^4
406k4 Most Cited Cases

£91 Criminal Law 0*13.1(1)
110kl3.im Most Cited Cases

"Convicted," as used in statute prohibiting
a person convicted of a felony offense or
under an indictment from possessing a
handgun, means guilty by verdict or plea,
rather than by judgment of conviction at
sentencing.
U.C.A.19 5 3.
76-10-503r3yayiU1999Y

The failure to define a statutory term is not
necessarily fatal to a statute.

indictment, or the guilty plea or verdict
was set aside or overturned, he would no
longer be a restricted person, however, at
time of plea, defendant was restricted
based upon that conviction resulting from
the plea or verdict.
U.C. A. 1953.
76-lQ-303(3)(tyfl f 1999Y
I S Statutes ^ 2 0 8
361k208 Most Cited Cases

|7J Sentencing and Punishment €^30
350Hk30 Most Cited Cases
A guilty defendant who is considered
worthy of a reduced sentence should
receive all the advantages that go with
such leniency.
[81 Constitutional Law ^258(3.1)
92k258f3.n Most Cited Cases

*

'

,

<

[101 Criminal Law 0^13.1(1)
110kl3,l( 1) Most Cited Cases
'

A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if
it is sufficiently explicit to inform the
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited
and does so in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.
*501 Linda M. Jones. Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
JM-Graham, Attorney General and Kris
f! Leonard. Assistant Attorney General,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
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Before Judges JACKSON, DAVIS, and
ORME.
OPINION
DAVIS. Judge:
% 1 Defendant Chamnap In appeals from
his judgment of conviction for possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-503f3yaYfl (Siipp.l997Y fFNl]
Defendant argues that he was not a
"restricted person" as defined in section
76-10- S03f3XaXi) because, although he
had pleaded guilty to a prior felony at the
time of this offense, he had not been
sentenced on that prior felony, and thus, he
had not yet "been convicted of any felony
offense." See id. Defendant further
contends that if his first argument fails, his
due process rights were violated because
the statute fails to give adequate notice, it
is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and
it interferes with his right to bear arms.
We affirm.
FN1. This statute has since been
amended. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-503 fSupp.2000Y Although
those amendments are not material
to the analysis of this case, we rely
on the version of the statute which
was in effect in January 1998 when
defendant committed the offense.

BACKGROUND

1f 2 Defendant, a member of the Tiny
Oriental Posse gang, was involved in the
drive-by shooting of a member of the
Oriental Laotian Gangsters, a rival gang.
Defendant pleaded guilty to discharging a
firearm from a vehicle, a third degree
felony, in violation of Ut^X^de..ADB.:..^
76-10-508 fSupp. 1997V on January 23,
1998. Sentencing on that offense was set
for August 7, 1998. One week later, on
January 30,1998, defendant was involved
in another shootout. Pursuant to an
investigation of that shootout, defendant
admitted he was in possession of a
handgun, and was subsequently charged
with possession of a dangerous weapon by
a restricted person, in violation of Utah
Cgcfc A f t § 76-|0-503(3)(a)fl)
fSttpp.!997>, Defendant's status as a
restricted person was based solely on his
prior guilty plea to a third degree felony.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
L1JI2J13] % 3 Defendant asks us to address
the following narrow issue: In the context
of Utah Code Ann. $ 76-10-503(3 ){a)(i). is
one "convicted" who has pleaded guilty, or
been found guilty by a trier of fact but has
not yet been sentenced and a judgment of
conviction has not yet been entered? " '[I]f
the trial court's order is premised on
statutory interpretation, as it is here, we
afford the trial court's interpretation no
deference and review for correctness.' "
State v. Dominguez. 1999 UT App 343. <[|
6. 992 P.2d 995 (citation omitted).
Defendant contends, in the alternative, if
we hold he is a restricted person under
section 76-10- 503(3XaXi)« then a
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subsequent conviction under section
Te-lO-SOS^XaVi^ violates his due process
rights because the statute fails to give
adequate notice, is susceptible to arbitrary
enforcement, and interferes with one's
right to bear arms. [FN2]
"A
constitutional challenge to a statute
presents a question of law, which we
review for correctness." State v. Lopes,
1999 UT 24 J 6. 980 P.2d 191. "When
addressing such a challenge, this court
presumes that the statute is valid, and we
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality." /#
FN2. Defendant's attorney stated in
oral argument that he was not
challenging the statute on its face.
ANALYSIS
L4] 14 Utah Code Ann, (f 76-10-503(3Ma)
(Supp.1997) states in pertinent part, "A
person may not... possess... any handgun
... who: (i) has been convicted of any
felony offense under the laws of the
United States, *502 this state, or any other
state; [or] (ii) is under indictment..." Id.
In this case, defendant disputes the trial
court's interpretation of the meaning of
"convicted."
"Previous cases have
acknowledged that in the legal context,
there are two common meanings for
'conviction': one which denotes the
establishment of 'guilt by verdict or plea'
and one which refers to 'thefinaljudgment
entered on the plea or verdict.' " State v.
Hunt. 906 P.2d 311. 313 (Utah 1995)
(quoting State v. Duncan 812 P.2d 60, 62

(Utah Ct.App. 1991\); cf. Stare v. Eweil.
883 P.2d 1360.
l3a(UttkCU^A^)
(holding that definition of "conviction" in
context of Utah Code Ana j ,76-3-2()3i4)
(1990) firearms enhancement does not
include sentencing).
[5] f 5 The determination of which
definition controls turns on " 'the context
and the purpose within which the term
"conviction" is used/ " Hunt. 906 P. 2d at
313 (quoting Duncan. 812 P.2d at 62).
"Indeed, it is a 'fundamental principle of
statutory construction ... that the meaning
of a word cannot be determined in
isolation, but must be drawn from the
context in which it is used .' " /# (quoting
Dealv. United States. 508 U.S. 129, 131
113 S.Ct. 1993. 1996, 124 L.EA2d 44
(1993)).
[6] H 6 With respect to section
76-10-503(3Xa)« the context and purpose
within which the term "convicted" is used
indicate that the proper meaning here is
guilt by verdict or plea rather than by
judgment of conviction at sentencing.
The purpose of such a law is to restrict
access of weapons to those who could be
dangerous to society. The statute restricts
access to handguns not only to convicted
felons, but also to people under
indictment. It would be illogical to restrict
a person from possessing a handgun who
has merely been accused of committing a
crime and is under indictment, but then
allow that person to turn around and
possess a handgun upon a plea or verdict
of guilt pending sentencing. {FN3J
Indeed, the thrust of this statute is to
restrict one's possession of a handgun upon
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an indication that one may be a danger to
society.
See Utah Code Ann. $
76-10-503m fSupp. 1997V Thus, the
context and purpose of this statute indicate
that convicted refers to a plea or verdict of
guilt, and not to a judgment of conviction.
FN3. Even if one were later
allowed to withdraw his or her plea,
or the court entered the conviction
for a lower category of offense, one
could still be guilty of possession
of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person. Such afindingis
consistent with the legislative
intent, just as one could violate this
statute while under indictment even
if he or she was later found not
guilty.
1f 7 This holding is also consistent with the
analysis in Stare v. Hunt. 906 P,2d 311
(Utah 1995V in which the Utah Supreme
Court held that the meaning of conviction
in the context of a sentencing enhancement
statute referred to "the determination of
guilt by verdict or plea rather than by
judgment of conviction." Id. at 313. The
supreme court reasoned that if conviction
referred to judgment of conviction then "a
defendant could commit an offense, be
charged for that offense, and commit
another offense while the charges were
pending without being subject to the
enhancement provision." M. Likewise,
defendant committed a crime with a
handgun, after pleading guilty to a felony,
while sentencing and judgment were
pending on that felony. Such a situation

is consistent with the language of the
statute, and "[w]e decline to inject ... an
amendment into the otherwise plain
language of the statute." M
f 8 In Stare v. BwelL 883 P.2d 1360 (Utah
CtApp. 1993V this court examined a
firearm enhancement statute, UtaLCojIe
Ann. § 76-3-203^ ri990V which
distinguished the terms "sentenced" from
"convicted," and held that sentencing must
precede the second felony conviction in
order to impose the enhancement. See Id,
at 1363. That holding is consistent with
our holding here because the language at
issue in Ewell supports the proposition that
the Legislature is well aware of the
difference between "convicted" and
"sentenced." See id. at 1364-65 (Jackson,
J., concurring).
[21K 9 Finally, State v. Duncan. 812P.2d
60 (Utah CtApp. 1991V addressed whether
a witness could be impeached for a felony
plea which was reduced to a misdemeanor
at sentencing. In Duncan^ we held that
the witness could not be impeached for the
felony, once he had been sentenced to the
misdemeanor. See id ,at 64, This
holding is not *503 inconsistent with our
holding here. "A guilty defendant who is
considered worthy of a reduced sentence
should receive all the advantages that go
with such leniency." hi at 64. Likewise,
here, if a defendant was found innocent
after indictment, or the guilty plea or
verdict was set aside or overturned, he
would no longer be a restricted person.
However, at the time of the plea, the
defendant would be restricted based upon
that conviction resulting from the plea or
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verdict.
il 10 Thus, in the context of possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person,
see Utah Code Aim. $ 76-10-503(3)(a)(i)
(Supp.1997), the term "convicted" refers
either to the entry of a guilty plea or to a
guiltyverdict, and does not refer to the
later entry of judgment on the conviction.
[8] if 11 Next, defendant argues that his
due process rights were violated because
the statute fails to give adequate notice, is
susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and
interferes with one's right to bear arms.
We disagree.
|9)[1Q] f 12 First, section
76-lQ«503(3Xftyi) gives adequate notice.
"[T]he failure to define a statutory term is
not necessarily fatal to a statute." State v.
Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305. j[ 10. 989
P.2d503: see also State v. Krueger. 1999
UT App 054. J 23. 975 P.2d 489. cert
granted, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999)
(noting adequate notice of prohibited
conduct even when statute failed to define
term "delinquent"); State v. (Mens. 638
P.2d 118X1185 (Utah 198tt (upholding
constitutionality of statute when term
"gross deviation" was not defined); Salt
Lake Citv v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259. 1265
OJtah CtApp. 19971 (holding failure to
define "emotional distress" in statute "does
not render the statute unconstitutionally
vague").
"[A] statute is not
unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently
explicit to inform the ordinary reader what
conduct is prohibited and does so in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement."

Krueger 1999 [JT App 054 at J23, 975
P.2d 489; see also Greeimood v. City of
K Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah
1991V Here, the definition of "convicted"
"is sufficiently explicit to inform the
ordinary reader what conduct is
prohibited." Krueger, 1999 UT App 054
at If 23.975P.2d489. In common usage,
the verb "convict" means "tofindor prove
to be guilty."
Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 287 (1986); see also
Black's Law Dictionary 335 (7th ed. 1999)
("To find (a person) guilty of a criminal
offense either upon a criminal trial, a plea
of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere (no
contest).")
In addition, the statute
prohibits a person under indictment from
possessing a handgun.
It would be
unreasonable for a person to interpret the
term "convicted" under its technical
definition of the actual entry of judgment
of conviction, as opposed to its more
common meaning of afindingor proving
of guilt, especially in light of the
prohibition against possessing a handgun
when indicted, which is a mere accusation
of a crime.
f 13 Second, this statute is not susceptible
to arbitrary enforcement. The statute is
narrowly constructed and there is no
assertion that others have been treated
differently in the application of this statute.
In addition, the statute does not vest
unlimited enforcement discretion in
anyone.
i| 14 Finally, this statute does not
unconstitutionally interfere with one's right
to bear arms. Tliis statute only restricts

that riglrt tm
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circumstances-such as a felony indictment
or coiwictMML ifeg C^tah Code Ann. .$
76-10^03ftttM fSiif».I997>. Such
reactions are constitutional SeeVt^h
Const, art. L S 6 ("nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining the
lawful use of aims"); ^ State v... Beorvhja^
530 P.2d 813. 815 (Utah 19741 (holding
that this section is a proper exercise of
State police powers).
CONCLUSION
115 The trial court did not err in finding
defendant a "restricted person" as defined
in section 76-10-503(3 )('d)(i) based upon
his prior felony plea of guilty at the time of
this offense. In addition, defendant's due
process rights were not violated. The
statute gives adequate notice, is not
susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and
does not unconstitutionally interfere with
defendant's right to bear arms. We affirm.

*504 1f 16 I CONCUR: JACKSON.
Associate Presiding Judge.
1 17 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
GREGORY K.ORME. Judge.
END OF DOCUMENT
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig.
U.S. Govt. Works
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Addendum D

451 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,
(Citeas:52P.3d461)
C

92k48m Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals of Utah.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Wade WILLIS, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20010495-CA.
July 5, 2002.

When addressing a constitutional
challenge to a statute, the reviewing court
presumes that the statute is valid, and
resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.
[31 Weapons °^1
406kl Most Cited Cases
[3] Weapons *^4
406k4 Most Cited Cases

Defendant was convicted in Fourth
District Court, Provo Department, Gary D.
Stott, J., of possession of a firearm by a
restricted person. Defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Jackson, P. J., held that
Weapons Restriction Statute was not
unconstitutional.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes

Weapons Restrictions Statute that
prohibited defendant from possessing a
firearm was a valid exercise of State police
power and did not violate Second
Amendment, where statute restricted the
right under very limited circumstances
such as felony indictment or conviction.
U.&CA CongtAmgnj 2; Const, Art.. 1,
16; U.C.A. 1953. 76-10-503(2 Ha).
*461 Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for
Appellant.

Ul Criminal Law °^1134(3)
110kll34(3) Most Cited Cases

Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

A constitutional challenge to a statute
presents a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness.

Before Judges JACKSON. DAVIS, and
THORNE.

[21 Constitutional Law ^ 4 8 ( 1 )
92k48(n Most Cited Cases
121 Constitutional Law ^ 4 8 ( 3 )

OPINION
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11 1 Defendant appeals his conviction
subsequent to a conditional guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a restricted
person, a second-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. &
76-10-3031^ fSuppJOOtt (Weapons
Restrictions Statute). [FN1] We affirm.
FNL This section provides, in
pertinent part, "[a] Category I
restricted person who purchases,
transfers, possesses, uses, or has
under his custody or control: (a)
any firearm is guilty of a second
degree felony." Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-503f2Va;> (SuppJOOl).
[ l p ] 112 Defendant challenges the statute
under which he was convicted as being
unconstitutional on its face.
" 'A
constitutional challenge to a statute
presents a question of law, which we
review for correctness.... When addressing
such a challenge, *462 this court presumes
that the statute is valid, and we resolve any
reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.'" Slate v. Morrison 2001
UT 73tf 5, 31 P.34 547 (Utah 2001)
(alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Lopes. 1999 UT 24* 6. 980 P,2d 191).
ANALYSIS
[3j 1f 3 State v. In 2000 UT App 358. 18
P.3d 500. is controlling. In that case we
stated that the Weapons Restrictions
Statute
does not unconstitutionally interfere with

one's right to bear arms. This statute
only restricts that right under very
limited circumstances-such as a felony
indictment or conviction.
Such
restrictions are constitutional. SeeUMl
Const, art L § 6 ...;[ [FN2]] Stale v.
BeorchicL S3Q P.2d 813,815 (Utah 1974)
(holding that this section is a proper
exercise of State police powers).
FN2. Utah Const, art. I § 6
provides: "The individual right of
the people to keep and bear arms
for security and defense of self,
family, and others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but
nothing herein shall prevent the
legislaturefromdefining the lawful
use of arms."
Id at If 14. Defendant attempts to
distinguish the present case by arguing that
In only addresses the constitutionality of
the statute as it applies to use, as opposed
to "mere possession of a firearm by a
restricted person." (Emphasis added.)
However, our conclusion in In, a case in
which the defendant was convicted of
illegally possessing a firearm, simply
stated that the restrictions contained in
"this statute do[ ] not unconstitutionally
interfere with one's right to bear arms,"
and made no distinction between use and
possession. M. Because [n made no
distinction between use and possession, its
conclusion that the Weapons Restrictions
Statute is constitutional applies both to
restrictions on possession and to
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restrictions on use. [FN3|
FN3. Moreover, we note that one
may "use" a firearm by the mere act
of possessing it—e.g., to deter
unlawful behavior in "defense of
self, family, and others" etc. Utah
Const art.L § 6. By way of further
illustration, we note that the United
States, by mere possession of a
nuclear arsenal, theoretically "uses"
that arsenal to deter would-be
aggressors from taking military
action against it. We also note that
Utah Const art. L § 6 makes no
distinction between passive use and
active use of a firearm.
f 4 Accordingly, we reject Defendant's
constitutional challenge to the Weapons
Restrictions Statute and affirm his
conviction for possession of a firearm by a
restricted person.
U 5 Affirmed.
H 6 We Concur: JAMES Z. DAVIS and
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR.. Judges.
52 P.3d 461,451 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,2002
UTApp229
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